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OTTOMAN MILLET, RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM, AND CIVIL SOCIETY:
FOCUS ON KOSOVO1
James R. Payton, Jr.
Dr. James R. Payton, Jr., is Professor of History and Chair of the Department of History at
Redeemer University College, in Ancaster, Ontario, Canada.  Since 1998, he has also served
as executive secretary of CAREE (Christians Associated for Relationships with Eastern
Europe).  His most recent article in REE was in Vol. 24, No. 5 (2004).
Civil Society
In the lands of Southeastern Europe, establishing civil societies has been an
extraordinary challenge.  The wars that raged or started there at the beginning of the twentieth
century, with the ongoing tensions and strife that kept resentment bubbling through much of
the century, to the conflicts that closed it in the former Yugoslavia, have shown how far the
ideal of civil society has been from the situation attained on the ground.  All this invites
scholarly examination, as a contribution toward pursuing and achieving civil society in the
region.
In this regard, while some scholars are drawn to the conflicts themselves, my interest
is in investigating the deeper historical backgrounds which have shaped the attitudes and
orientations of peoples in the region.  If we hope to assist the establishment of civil societies
in Southeastern Europe, one of the things we must do is attempt to get inside those attitudes
and orientations, to enable us to understand the outlooks of the peoples in the region which
influence how they view and end up relating to their neighbors.  However, doing even that for
the whole of Southeastern Europe would be a massive undertaking, far beyond what I might
hope to achieve.
My special interest is more modest, if still daunting – namely, in the challenges
facing the establishment of civil society in two neighboring regions, Kosovo and Macedonia.
In them both, the population is predominantly comprised of Albanians and Slavs, peoples of
two significantly different ethnic, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds.  In both lands, the
Albanian and Slavic residents have encountered and lived next to each other for centuries.
Even so, in the face of common overarching experience lasting many generations in the two
territories, significant differences manifest themselves in the relationships between the Slavs
and Albanians in Kosovo, on the one hand, and in Macedonia, on the other.  What I hope to
While much remains to be done, promising beginnings can be noted: see the presentation by Paul Mojzes,2
“From Crisis to Post-Crisis in Macedonia,” Religion in Eastern Europe 22, No. 4 (2002):47-52, which summarizes
the events leading up to and the outcomes of the interreligious conference, “Confidence Building between the
Churches and Religious Communities in Macedonia through Dialogue,” held May 10-14, 2002.  One of the results
of that conference was the establishment of a Council for Interreligious Cooperation; see follow-up reports on the
progress of this council at www.caree.info/news/index.shtml, especially “Return to Macedonia” (October 11-17, 2004)
and “Report on Visit to Macedonia” (October 8-13, 2005). 
Stevan K. Pavlowitch, A History of the Balkans 1804-1945 (New York: Longman, 1999), 6. 3
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do is explore the similarities and the differences in those relationships through investigating
historical influences that have shaped Southeastern Europe, and, in both regions, the way
each of the two peoples has viewed its history and status, and how each has seen the other.
The reason this is intriguing to me is that, while both regions have known sharp tensions,
civil society is finding its difficult way in Macedonia,  while in Kosovo it remains an elusive2
dream.  My investigations to this point have focused on Kosovo; this paper reports on what I
have found so far in that regard. 
Ottoman Millet
A few months after his May 29, 1453, conquest of Constantinople, Sultan Mehmet II
(“the Conqueror”) made a fateful decision regarding the organization of his expanding
empire.  That decision significantly shaped how the Ottoman Turkish government would
relate to its subjects for the next four and one-half centuries, down to the revolution of the
Young Turks in 1908.  Through the ebb and flow of Ottoman rule – from its high point of
efficiency and comparative beneficence toward its subjects in Mehmet II’s time to the mid-
seventeenth century, through the decreasingly capable and increasingly corrupt rule that
marked the empire from then on through the nineteenth century – this 1454 decision of
Mehmet the Conqueror remained a constant.  It shaped not only the way the Ottoman rulers
viewed their subjects, but also how those subjects viewed themselves and their neighbors.  Its
legacy is still with us in Southeastern Europe to the present day, for it molded perceptions in
ways that have persisted through history – and which have made establishing civil societies in
the region a considerable challenge. 
Mehmet II’s decision was to structure the organization of the empire in “millets.”  In
contemporary Turkish usage, “millet” means “nation” ; however, in the fifteenth century, and3
down through the generations to near the end of the Ottoman Empire, the term did not
connote a “nation” in the sense in which we commonly use that term in the present day.  In
Miranda Vickers notes, “Religion not nationality was the fundamental factor in the Ottoman concept of4
governance” (Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo [New York: Columbia University Press, 1998], 19).
Mark Mazower points out, “According to the tax registers of 1520-1530, more than 80 percent of the5
inhabitants of the Balkans were Christians” (The Balkans: A Short History [New York: The Modern Library, 2000],
24-25); he indicates that this percentage remained constant (cf. his comments at 47).
Cf. the treatments of “millet” in Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish6
Empire (New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1977), 112-113; in Peter F. Sugar, Southeastern Europe under
Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804, A History of East Central Europe, vol. 5 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977),
5-6, 45-47, 273-274; and in Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries
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this usage, “millet” focused, not on nation, but on religion.   The “millet” system organized4
the Ottoman Empire according to religious adherence, rather than by geographical location,
economic status, or ethnic background.
Already by the fifteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had become a state which
included a wide array of peoples who adhered to various religions.  Not all religions received
the approved status accorded to the recognized millets in Ottoman governance, though: such
tolerance was accorded only to Judaism and Christianity, the “religions of the book” – a
Muslim designation for the monotheist religions that had preceded and culminated (according
to Muslim teaching) in Islam.  In due course, millets were established for Orthodox
Christianity, Armenian Christianity (for non-Chalcedonian churches), and Judaism.
Members of these millets enjoyed protected, but nonetheless second-class, status in the
Ottoman Empire.  First-class status was enjoyed only by Muslims.
The first millet established was that of Orthodox Christianity.  Since the
overwhelming preponderance of the Ottomans’ subjects in Southeastern Europe were
adherents of Orthodox Christianity,  this offered Ottoman oversight to a considerable portion5
of the empire at the time.  The oversight thus afforded was genuinely shaped by the religious
heritage of the respective millet communities.  While Ottoman law stipulated taxes and
required, in cases involving disputes including Muslims, that trials be conducted in Ottoman
courts and in accordance with Islamic sharia law, in other matters the accepted practices of
the millet obtained.  Thus, Orthodox Christians were governed according to Orthodox
Christian standards and laws (for family matters [including  marriage, divorce, inheritance,
etc.], for legal cases short of murder, and a wide variety of other concerns).  All this was
overseen by the patriarch in Constantinople (now renamed Istanbul) – who, of course, relied
on a number of appointed Orthodox Christian officials and representatives to administer the
millet.  For it all, though, the patriarch was responsible to the sultan for the conduct of the
people of his millet and for their manifestation of loyalty to or rebellion against the Ottoman
state.6
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1:49-50. 
Sugar notes, “The millet system is invariably cited [by scholars] as the greatest stumbling block to the7
creation of an integrated society,” and he goes on to assess this as “the fundamental weakness of the Ottoman state”
(231).
During the 1860s and 1870s, Ottoman rulers revised the millet system somewhat, but without changing the8
basic purpose and orientation: cf. the discussion in Pavlowitch, 101.
While initially denied to Khan Boris I of Bulgaria in 865, under his son, Khan Symeon, this privilege was9
secured in 926.  (This status was revoked when Emperor Basil II brought an end to the first Bulgarian Empire in 1014.
The return of that status remained a fond hope of Bulgarian leaders, however; in 1870, the Ottoman Empire renewed
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It is understandable that Mehmet the Conqueror chose this path.  In Islamic political
thought as it had developed to that point, the main issue was religion: Muslim teaching
organized the world and understood it according to religion.  In their specific approach,
Muslims were Allah’s servants in spreading the rule of Islam throughout the world.  This
stance only rarely led to pressures on subject peoples to convert to Islam; it was adequate that
Muslims ruled over the conquered territories.  By Ottoman practice, only Muslims could
serve in the sultan’s court or expect to rise in the structures of government.  As well, Muslims
were spared the additional taxes levied on non-Muslims throughout the Ottoman domain:
those taxes supported the military which defended and expanded the rule of Islam, a military
composed almost exclusively – apart from some mercenary troops or “vassal” forces – of
Muslims.  While Ottoman society knew no “noble” or “aristocratic” class, there was no
question that Muslims as a whole – whatever their economic status – received preferential
treatment in Ottoman governance.
While this fit with Islamic political attitudes of the time, the millet system had one
major drawback significant for our considerations: it precluded the development of an
integrated society within the empire.   Each millet looked to its own affairs, unaware of and7
unaffected by those of the other millets.  While the adherents of the millets had to reckon
with Muslim oversight, the structure did not encourage them to identify with their Ottoman
rulers, and they could not aspire to the first-class status open only to Muslims.
Differentiation, rather than integration, was ineluctably built into the millet system.  This was
not soil in which the seed of civil society could take root.
Even so, the millet system meshed with the prior experience and orientations of the
peoples of Southeastern Europe.   With the exception of the Slovenes, the Croats and the8
residents of Bosnia, the Slavic peoples of the region all had converted to Orthodox
Christianity in earlier centuries.  Not only had both of the major Slavic nations that arose in
the region, the Bulgars and the Serbs, embraced Orthodox Christianity; both had also sought
and attained autocephalous status for the church in their respective nations.   This status9
the autocephalous privileges of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.)  Among the Serbs, the negotiations of St Sava
resulted in the grant of autocephaly by Byzantine civil and ecclesiastical authorities in 1219.  
Cf. Tim Judah’s observation about this: “Their images [those of the Nemanjiæ rulers] were painted on to10
the walls of Serbian churches and monasteries.  So, for hundreds of years, the Serbian peasant went to church and in
his mind the very idea of Christianity, resurrection and ‘Serbdom’ blended together” (Kosovo: War and Revenge, 2d
ed. [New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Nota Bene, 2002], 3. 
While we must be careful not to import notions or understandings of nationalism, which only developed11
subsequently in the nineteenth century, into earlier periods, concern regarding that anachronism should not lead to
the unreflective assumption that the peoples of earlier centuries can have had no awareness of themselves as a people
associated with their respective leaders and their churches.  
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allowed the church in each nation to govern itself.  In this way, Orthodoxy in Southeastern
Europe had become closely tied to nation.  With the liturgies of Orthodox worship performed
in Slavonic, which was then a close approximation to the language spoken by the Slavic
peoples of the region, with the consciousness of national self-governance in ecclesiastical
affairs, and with the close association of church and state in the leadership of their respective
realms, the Slavic peoples’ notions of church and nation were intricately intertwined, before
contact with the Ottomans.
Moreover, the close tie between Orthodoxy and nation was driven home by Orthodox
church buildings themselves.  The typical pattern, especially among the Nemanjiæ rulers of
the Serbian state, was for kings to see to the building of churches and monasteries; indeed,
the vast majority of Orthodox church buildings from the Nemanjiæ period were erected under
the sponsorship of the Serbian kings.  The iconography within the churches conspired to
drive this point home, as well: icons of the Savior and the Theotokos met with those of the
saints from the history of the church, including those who had come from that particular
people group.  More specifically, the churches almost always included icons depicting the
donation of the church by the respective ruler who had commissioned it.  In this way, the
people worshiping within these edifices came to associate the Savior, the saints of church
history, the worthies of their people, and the kings who had ruled this people in an
undifferentiated coalition of faith.   While we cannot claim that the Orthodox peoples of10
Southeastern Europe already had a national consciousness in the later romantic sense that
emerged only in the nineteenth century, it is surely legitimate to recognize that what we have
just described paved the way for it in Southeastern Europe.   That is to say, the peoples of11
Southeastern Europe, both in the time of their nations’ independence and of their subsequent
subjugation under the Ottomans, sensed an intimate connection between their situation as a
people of a particular background, on the one hand, and as Orthodox Christians, on the
In commenting on the significance of the Orthodox millet, Barbara Jelavich points out that it “kept the12
Christian community almost unchanged in an ideological sense until the age of the national movements” (1:52), and
Sugar observes that through the millet system “the church became a symbol of independence, if not of nationhood”
(278).
This was especially clear in Kosovo: Malcolm comments, “The growth of Islam in Kosovo, during the13
early Ottoman period, was an almost exclusively urban phenomenon” (105).
Owing to the conversion forced upon the children taken in the devºirme, as well as conversions by some14
among the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire, Noel Malcolm notes, “the Ottoman ruling class became an ethnic
mélange of its subject peoples” (Kosovo: A Short History [London: Macmillan, 1998], 96); cf. also the comments at
Pavlowitch, 8-9.
Dennis P. Hupchick, Culture and History in Eastern Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 149.15
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other.   Because of this, the millet approach adopted within the Ottoman Empire was not an12
imposition of something alien; rather, it squared with their prior experience and heritage.
Even so, the millet structure drove home the disparity between the privileges and
status of Muslims and of Orthodox Christians.  Heavier taxes, the dreaded devºirme (the
“child tax”), and restrictions of various sorts (from the colors that could be worn, through the
kinds of facial hair allowed to be sported by clerics, to opportunities for schooling and socio-
economic advancement), conspired to spawn resentment of Muslims.  The fact that cities
became, in due course, overwhelmingly Muslim in constituency,  while much of the rural13
outlands remained Orthodox Christian, exacerbated the common urban/rural tensions with a
religio-political one.
Consequently, it is scarcely surprising that adherents of the Orthodox Christian millet
came to resent the inhabitants of Southeastern Europe who converted to Islam, and who thus
came to enjoy the privileges and benefits accorded to Muslims.  The Ottoman Empire did not
manifest partiality toward Muslims of Turkish heritage, over and above those of other
backgrounds: Muslim privileges extended to all those who embraced Islam.   As noted14
above, the Ottomans did not engage in proselytism, seeking to enfold their subjects into the
Islamic faith; indeed, given the privileges that went with being a Muslim, the Ottomans
carefully scrutinized the motives and purposes of those who wanted to convert to Islam.
Even so, such conversions took place: sometimes a few families in one place or most of a
village in another, but occasionally large groups in a region or from a particular background
converted en masse.
One of the reactions to such conversion, especially germane to the concerns of this
paper, is the way Orthodox Christians came to speak of these converts to Islam.  For the
Orthodox Christians, these converts became “Turks.”   The people who used this epithet did15
not intend thereby that some ethnic or genetic changes were entailed in such conversion, of
course; indeed, the ones using the epithet may have known or been related to the converts.
Cf. the discussion of this in Malcolm, 129-130; it also finds abundant and repeated expression in the16
account of Rebecca West’s travels in the region: see her Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia
(New York: Penguin Books, 1982 [reprint of 1940/1941 ed.]).  
Cf. the insightful discussion in Malcolm, 75-76.17
B. Jelavich, 1:52.18
While the notion of age-old hatreds bubbling up perpetually in the Balkans is a modern western misreading19
of the history of the region, the notion came closest to fulfillment in Kosovo.
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However, by converting to another faith, those others had, indeed, become “other”: they had
crossed over to the other side – the side of the rulers, the privileged, the oppressors.
Henceforth, they were no longer Slavs or Vlachs or Albanians: they were Turks.  All
Muslims were “Turks,” in this estimation: whatever their ethnic background or prior heritage,
they were classed – not only by the Ottoman rulers, but by their neighbors, as well – as
Muslims.  They were on the side of the oppressors, no matter their actual socio-economic
status or privilege.  With the coming of romantic nationalism to Southeastern Europe in the
nineteenth century, this would have fateful consequences.
What we have considered so far suffices to describe the basic pattern in most of
Southeastern Europe.  None of this is to deny that friendly, cooperative relationships existed
between Muslims and Orthodox Christians, nor that they could live through generations
without particular tension because of their contrasting allegiances and consequent
privileges.   However long or widely such coexistence endured, though, the future for most16
of Southeastern Europe did not lie in this direction.  Tension and conflict lay ahead,
especially in Kosovo.
Indeed, Kosovo was demarked for this in three significant ways.  First of all, it had
been the scene of the Battle of Kosovo-Polje in 1389.  That battle may have ended in an
exhausted draw, but its outcome led inexorably to the demise of the Serbian Empire.   Via17
the folk songs and epic poetry which pointed sorrowfully back to that battle, Serbs learned to
view Kosovo as an especially holy place, the site of their forebears’ martyrdom for the sake
of Christianity against the forces of Islam.  Priestly exhortation had kept the Serbs aware that
their Turkish rulers had usurped Serb territory – or, more significantly, that the forces of
Antichrist now ruled, illegitimately, over lands originally dedicated to and still claimed by
Christ.   This sense of loss, of having been usurped, of suffering oppression under resented18
overlords of another faith, weighed heavily upon Orthodox Christians.  The millet system of
the Ottoman Empire assured an ongoing awareness of religious difference as at the root of all
other tensions; nowhere was this pressure as intense as it was in Kosovo.19
Note that we don’t need to go into the controverted question here of precisely who was dominant in20
population and when.
According to Vickers, “During the fifteenth century the great majority of Albanians were still Christians,21
and Serbs and Albanians lived together in considerable harmony” (19). 
Charles and Barbara Jelavich point out, “In the empire at least thirty of the grand vezirs had come from22
these Muslim Albanians.  Some of the finest and bravest Ottoman soldiers were born in this region” (The
Establishment of the Balkan National states, 1804-1920, A History of East Central Europe, vol. 8 [Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1977], 223); cf. also the treatment in B. Jelavich, 1:81. 
Cf. the discussion at Vickers, 26.23
On the Albanians’ conversion to Islam and the privileges that went with it for them, Alexander N.24
Dragnich and Slavko Todorovich comment, “All of this played a role in defining the new stratification of the society
under Ottoman rule, as well as the power balance among national groups.  Undoubtedly, the balance was shifting, and
as far as the Albanians and Serbs were concerned, it was shifting drastically in favor of the Albanians, to the detriment
of good relations between them” (The Saga of Kosovo: Focus on Serbian-Albanian Relations [New York: Columbia
University Press, 1984], 48 [emphasis added]); cf. also their observation, “The phenomenon of Islamization, and all
that it meant in terms of personal welfare and social advancement, still remained the main cause of the estrangement”
(52).
Noel Malcolm comments, “It [Kosovo] was one of the most characteristic parts of the Ottoman Empire25
in Europe.... Kosovo is, in many ways, Ottoman territory par excellence” (xxxv).
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In the second place, Kosovo was home to a large number of both Serbs and
Albanians.   Unlike the Bulgarians and the Serbs, the Albanians had not commonly20
embraced a single religion prior to the Ottoman entrance into Southeastern Europe.  Some
Albanians had turned to Catholicism; others had embraced Orthodoxy.   However, with the21
coming of the Ottomans, in relatively short order an overwhelming number of Albanians in
Kosovo converted to Islam: upwards of 70% of Albanians became Muslim.  This afforded
them privilege and status: a significant number of the Ottoman Empire’s grand viziers and
generals, plus a host of lesser officials, were Kosovar Albanians ; furthermore, Kosovars22
enjoyed educational and economic opportunities which their Serb compatriots could not hope
to attain.   The Kosovar Albanian conversion to Islam thus brought them in due course the23
intense resentment of their Serb neighbors who had remained Orthodox Christians.   As well,24
given that large-scale conversion, Serbs in Kosovo readily lumped the Kosovar Albanians
who maintained their Catholic or Orthodox commitments with those who had converted to
Islam: they were all Albanians, and the Albanians were all Turks, the local embodiments of
the repressive forces of Antichrist.
Thirdly, over the course of Ottoman rule, Kosovo came to be viewed, both in the
region itself and throughout the empire, as quintessentially Ottoman.   Evidences of Muslim25
privilege, manifestations of Ottoman dominance, and marks of the second-class status of the
members of the Orthodox Christian millet thus abounded in Kosovo; sensitivies were,
consequently, heightened there – especially for those who saw themselves repressed, the
Serbs.  Since Albanians played important roles throughout the empire, and especially in
“There is no doubt that the Albanians’ continued presence at the seat of power gave them an upper hand,26
which was the beginning of a tragic divisiveness, of separate roads for them and for the Serbs.  The former became
the rulers and the latter the ruled” (Dragnich and Todorovich, 50).
Albanian resentment of Ottoman misrule led to the establishment of the League of Prizren in 1878, and27
in 1912 an Albanian revolution broke the Ottoman hold on the region (and opened the door to the Balkan Wars); in
the nineteenth century, the Serbs had managed to break free from Ottoman overlordship and establish an independent
nation-state.
Mazower, 73.28
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Kosovo, this issued into keen resentment by the Orthodox Christians who believed they were
oppressed in this thoroughly Ottoman area by their Kosovar Albanian rulers.   It is true that26
Albanians also eventually became embittered by the corrupt governance which marked the
last two centuries of the Ottoman Empire.  Indeed, the inhabitants of Southeastern Europe,
Muslims and Christians alike, found abundant reason to resent Ottoman rule and seek to
break free from it; both succeeded.   Given, though, the common viewpoint that Kosovo was27
so thoroughly Ottoman, it is scarcely surprising that hostility toward Ottoman rule became
particularly sharp there.  With the collective dismissal (noted above) of all Albanians as
Muslims, and all Muslims as Turks, it is also not to be wondered at that Christian/Muslim –
that is to say, Serb/Albanian – tensions became especially heated in Kosovo.
Religious Nationalism
The entrance of romantic nationalism into Southeastern Europe aroused hopes for
political independence among the various subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire; Bulgars,
Romanians, Greeks, Serbs, and Albanians all were affected.  In the western European realm
in which it originated, romantic nationalism had no particular religious interest; rather, it
focused on what united a people – language, history, culture, and geography.  While religion
might otherwise have been seen as a significant contributor to such unities, the disunities
introduced into Western Europe during the religious wars of the seventeenth century,
followed by the dismissive attitude toward the influence of religion in the later stages of the
Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, insured that religion played no particular role in
romantic nationalism in Western Europe.  This perspective influenced the intelligentsia who
sought to foment nationalism in Southeastern Europe.
These purveyors of nationalistic ideas in the region did not think in terms of religious
unity, but of cultural communities : shared culture shaped nation, in their view.  Religion28
played no particular role in the thought of these spokesmen, unlike the peoples they sought to
influence.  Successful in fomenting nationalistic longings, the intelligentsia were nevertheless
Mazower, 76; cf. also the comments by Milica Bakiæ-Hayden, “National Memory as Narrative Memory:29
The Case of Kosovo,” 25-40, in Maria Todorova, ed., Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory (New York: New York
University Press, 2004), 33.  
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unable to dictate the way that nationalism was appropriated by their eager listeners.  The
peoples of the region all processed notions of what they shared in terms of the commonality
most familiar to them – their religion.  The only shared culture most of the peoples of the
region recognized was the faith and practice they shared in their Orthodox church, which in
the millet structure had continued throughout the centuries of Ottoman rule.  The millet
system of Ottoman governance had thus helped to assure that the most readily recognizable
unifying factor for a burgeoning nationalist movement in the region would be religion.
Whatever the nationalist intelligentsia thought, the peasants who empowered the uprisings
which actually led to the establishment of new nation-states remained firmly committed to
their church.   In Southeastern Europe, nationalism took on unmistakably religious29
overtones.  This was true for all the major peoples of the region except one: it obtained for
the Bulgars, Romanians, Greeks, and Serbs – but not for the Albanians.
This was the pattern, though, for all the Orthodox Christian peoples of Southeastern
Europe.  While the millet structure had continued to shape their understandings of
community, recent developments had conspired to restrict that community within the limits of
a particular people.  The non-Greeks were exasperated with a corrupt patriarchate which
imposed  Greek language and Hellenic prelates on the Slavic peoples.  They resented the
favoritism shown to Phanariot Greeks in appointments to positions of responsibility within
the millet, and they chafed at the rapaciousness of Phanariot mismanagement.  By the time
romantic nationalist ideas entered Southeastern Europe, the Slavic and Romanian peoples had
discarded loyalty to the Orthodox patriarch in Istanbul.  They still found their commonality
within the Orthodox Christian millet, but that commonality was now on a reduced scale: for
each of these peoples, that millet had been reduced to the Orthodox church among their own
people.
In this regard, though, the Albanians were a case apart.  The nationalism that
developed among them was not – indeed, it could not have been – religious in focus.  Given
the large preponderance of Muslims among the Albanians and the consequent privilege they
thus enjoyed, most Albanians had continued to identify with the Ottoman Empire longer than
did the Christian peoples of the region; only with the increasing fear of Albanians being
swallowed up by the Christian nations which intended to be established out of the dying
Cf. the discussion of this in C. and B. Jelavich, 223-224.30
According to Malcolm, “The Albanians of Kosovo ... are in many ways a politically mobilized people,31
but religion has played almost no role at all in that mobilization....” (xxviii); later, he contrasts the patterns manifest
in this regard in Bosnia and in Kosovo: “Although Islam, in a non-fundamentalist form, did play a part in the political
awakening of the Bosnian Muslims, its political role in Kosovo was so slight as to be quite invisible” (351).
The statement was made by a Catholic Albanian, Pashko Vasa (quotation as cited in Judah, 12).32
Mazower, 76.33
Dubravka Stojanoviæ expressed the transformation well when she wrote, “It is all about the absorption of34
nationalism in the language of religion, about making political speech sacred, about the replacement of Christianity
with the religion of the nation.  Nation becomes the parameter of all values...” (“Construction of Historical
Consciousness: The Case of Serbian History Textbooks,” 327-338 in Todorova, 335.)
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Ottoman Empire did the Albanians begin to develop a nationalistic movement.   In it,30
religion could play no motive role, for the Albanians were not united in religious
commitment: they were spread among a large Muslim majority and the nonetheless
significant Orthodox and Catholic communities.  This religious disunity precluded the
development of religious nationalism among them; indeed, religion played virtually no role in
the mobilization of Albanian nationalism.   An Albanian poet recognized the anomalous31
character of Albanian nationalism in the region when he said, “the religion of Albanians is
Albanianism.”32
Apart from the Albanians, though, the Southeastern European nationalist movements
which helped bring an end to the Ottoman Empire were all manifestations of religious
nationalism.  As in the initial structuring of the Ottoman Empire through Mehmet II”s
decision, so also as “the sick man of Europe” faced its demise, religion played a predominant
role.  Whatever else one might point to as a unifying factor for the respective Southeastern
European peoples – language, culture, history, geography, or any combination of these – the
unquestioned common ground for each of them was religion.  While religion thus was set to
continue as a major political factor in the period after the Ottoman Empire, as it had (under
different circumstances and with different limitations) during that empire, the significance of
religion itself changed in a key regard: it became a tag of national identity.   Nationalism in33
the region became religious nationalism.  In fuller development, religion was co-opted for
nationalistic purposes and usurped for political ends.34
All this was unquestionably the case with Serbia.  The Serbs achieved independence
from the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century.  Their self-awareness as a people
had been shaped by the epic songs about Kosovo sung over the centuries, and their success in
breaking the grip of the Ottoman overlords cemented their sense of themselves as a people.
Malcolm points out, “Another key factor [was] needed to determine Serbian-ness: and that factor,35
historically the most powerful one in building a Serb identity, [was] the Serbian Orthodox Church.... Its key role in
Serbian cultural life [has] been continuous.  When modern concepts of nationhood began to be propagated in the
nineteenth century, membership of this Church supplied a ready-made category of Serbian-ness” (12).
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Even so, the dominant factor in the establishment of Serb identity proved to be the Serbian
Orthodox Church.35
Looking across the border of Serbia toward Kosovo, though, proved painful for
Serbs.  The presence of hundreds of ancient churches in Kosovo, the historic homeland of the
Serbian Empire in the glory days of the Nemanjiæ rulers, insured a special interest in that
territory.  The fact that it had become quintessentially Ottoman, dominated by others who had
allegedly turned to Islam for privilege and who had made common cause with the oppressors,
steeled nationalistic resolve to retake the land of their forebears.
Serbian nationalism – a religious nationalism – repudiated the status quo and was
determined to right the wrongs inflicted long ago upon Christendom by liberating Kosovo
and establishing Serbian rule over it.  The stage was set for armed conflict – a conflict that
marked too much of the relationship between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians during the
twentieth century.  Before that took place, though, the Serbs’ religious nationalism added still
another combustible ingredient to the explosive mixture.
What transpired in Kosovo in that regard revealed a surprising side of religious
nationalism as it had developed in the region.  As we have noted, although overwhelmingly
Muslim, Kosovar Albanians were not united in religion, as were the Serbs in their
commitment to Orthodox Christianity.  Even so, as we have also seen, all converts to Islam –
whether Slav or Albanian or Vlach in heritage – had long been viewed by the Orthodox
Christians of Southeastern Europe as Turks.  The vast majority of Kosovar Albanians had
embraced Islam, and so were considered Turks; and the rest of the Albanians – even those
who were Catholic or Orthodox – had come to be tarred by the Serbs with the same brush as
those who had turned to Islam.
For the conflict-filled future, the issue was not whether Kosovar Albanians saw
themselves as united in religion.  The significant point for that future was that the Serbs saw
them so.  In the religious nationalism that shaped Serbian attitudes, the Kosovar Albanians
were all “Muslims” and “Turks.”  They were “the Other.”  Religious nationalism was not
only a self-chosen marker; it could also demarcate the other, even against the protests of that
other.
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With Kosovo as a quintessential Ottoman region, and with religious differences
finding outlet in nationalistic claims, Kosovo became the place where long-standing
resentment toward the oppressing Turks found its harshest expression.  This proved to be the
case in the Balkan Wars of the early twentieth century, the tensions in the first Yugoslavia,
World War II, the Communist period under Marshal Tito, and in the break-up of the former
Yugoslavia.  Serb nationalism cancelled out the inconvenient elements of Orthodox Christian
teaching prohibiting violence toward others, while nonetheless using religion as one of its
main unifying components.
However difficult for western scholars to appreciate, it nonetheless remains true that,
whatever people in the region may actually believe or practice of their religion, in
Southeastern Europe religion shapes nationalism, to the present day.  Because of the unusual
way it does so, civil society has proven difficult to achieve – especially in Kosovo.
